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From Honor to Dignity:
Criminal Libel, Press Freedom, and Racist Speech in Brazil and the United States
Jan Hoffman French
University of Richmond
Reports on violence against journalists in Brazil have captured media attention and the concern
of international organizations such as the Committee to Protect Journalists and Reporters Without
Borders.1 Short of violence, other concerns about press freedom have surfaced, such as the successful
assertion by public figures of their right to keep unauthorized biographies out of print. The case
presented in this article involves another such concern: the use of criminal defamation laws to punish
journalists for criticizing public officials.2 At the same time, Brazilian media sources regularly report
on crimes of racism, which most often involve derogatory name-calling and hate speech. By examining
the intersection of these apparently contradictory concerns, this article sheds new light on speech
rights in Brazil and the United States and argues that a comparative perspective is crucial to
contextualizing and harmonizing free speech and its limitations under modern democratic
constitutions.
The Case and the Law
When I first learned that a Brazilian blogger and journalist, José Cristian Góes, from the small
northeastern state of Sergipe, had been prosecuted and found guilty of criminal libel, it seemed like an
open and shut case of government repression and a clear human rights violation. International press
freedom organizations had picked up on the case and Góes, who is not a nationally-known figure, was
flown by Article 19, an international nongovernmental organization,3to testify at a public hearing of
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of the Organization of American States in October
2013.4 His case was presented as indicative of a lack of press freedom in Brazil and posited as a human
rights violation. As I investigated the circumstances of the case and looked into its legal underpinnings,
it became clear that my perspective as a United States lawyer and anthropologist had led me to assume
that freedom of speech from a constitutional perspective is an uncomplicated, universal principle and
that my assumptions needed to be revised. I discovered that a single case that could have been scripted
for the Theater of the Absurd might shed light on larger issues associated with free speech in Brazil,
the United States, and other democratic countries. As noted by comparative law scholar, Ronald
Krotoszynski, “[u]nlike some rights, free speech simply is not the subject of broad transnational
consensus as to either its shape or scope” (222).
Without delving too much into its deeper political history and meaning, the blogger’s case can
be outlined as follows: In 2009, Edson Ulisses de Melo, a lawyer who had been involved in a variety
of human rights initiatives in the capital city of Aracaju and a respected member of the local bar
association, was named by his brother-in-law, Marcelo Déda, governor of Sergipe and a strong
supporter of the national Workers Party (the ruling party of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, president from
2003 to 2010, and Dilma Rousseff, president from 2011 to 2018), to sit as a judge on the highest court
of the state of Sergipe.5 When the appointment was announced, José Cristian Góes posted a series of
blog entries complaining of possible nepotism. 6 Although not mentioned in the blog, Déda was
diagnosed with pancreatic and stomach cancer in 2009 and died at the age of 53 in December 2013.
In May 2012, when Governor Déda was taking his final round of chemotherapy, Góes posted a
“fictional” story told in the first person from the ostensible perspective of the governor, although he
was not named.7 The published story portrayed the narrator as an old-fashioned coronel, a despotic,

Vanderbilt e-Journal of Luso-Hispanic Studies

3

oligarchical figure (common in Brazilian history and folklore) who controlled large estates and the
peasants who worked on them.8 This was a metaphor for Déda’s control of the state with specific
reference to alleged misuse of state funds. Góes wrote, presumably in the voice of Déda, “I am the
one with the money, despite the view that the money is public. I am the big boss. I am the one who
hires and fires. I am the one who contracts ass-kissers, gunmen, and jesters…” Obliquely, but
recognizably, referring to a statewide teachers’ strike earlier that year and a building occupation by an
urban social movement, against which Judge Edson Ulisses had issued injunctions, the story
continued, still in Déda’s presumed voice, “It is said that strikes are part of democracy and I have to
accept that. I accept nothing. I hired a personal gunman of the laws (jagunço das leis), who is, not by
coincidence, the husband of my sister, and gave these people a kick in the butt”. Judge Edson Ulisses
brought a criminal complaint for defamation, charging that Góes had impugned his reputation and
offended his dignity.
In Brazil, defamation, in addition to being a civil claim, can carry criminal penalties. Under the
current Brazilian Penal Code there are three privately-initiated criminal actions referred to as “crimes
against honor”, in descending order of punitive harshness: calumny or falsely accusing someone of a
crime (six months to two years and a fine); defamation (three months to a year and a fine); and injúria
(which may be translated as offensive insult) (three months to a year and a fine). The prohibition
against injúria was amended in 1997 to increase penalties if the offensive language makes reference to
race, color, ethnicity, religion, or origin (referred to as injúria qualificada) and in certain cases, penalties
may be increased if the offended party is a public official (and the offense goes to the function of the
position), elderly or disabled.9 In the case at hand, the blogger José Cristian Góes was prosecuted, at
the judge’s initiative, under the injúria section of the law, found guilty, and the decision was affirmed
on appeal.10 Góes was not fined, but was sentenced to perform community service (in lieu of a sevenmonth term of house detention), although in subsequent blog postings and other reports about the
case, Góes stated that he was “condemned to prison”. Albeit inaccurate, international organizations
picked up and used this language in their reports to enhance their assertion that press freedom is under
attack in Brazil.
Góes asserted in his defense that the column was a work of fiction, even though to anyone
familiar with state and local politics there could have been no doubt as to whom it was referring. In
court papers and blog posts after the original July 4, 2013 trial court decision and before the appellate
court upheld it three months later, Góes hung his argument entirely on the assertion that it was only
“possible” to identify Governor Déda and Judge Edson Ulisses since the story had been written in
the first person. Based on the language of the law and jurisprudential interpretations, as well as
testimonial evidence, both courts ruled that no one could mistake the identities of the characters in
the story and that the judge’s honor had been offended, his reputation besmirched, and his dignity
damaged. The trial court found that “journalists have the right to opine against and criticize, even in
severe, ironic, and merciless ways, any person or authority, but this right is limited by the fundamental
right to intimidade [intimacy, selfhood, privacy] of the person who is the target of the criticisms.”
Looking to the penal code provisions, the finding that the judge had suffered injúria was all but
impossible to avoid. It was clear that the blog post referred to the judge and that his reputation in
relation to his public functions had been impugned. This was all the statute required and the state
courts deciding the case were not in a position to declare the federal statute unconstitutional even if
they had wanted to do so.11
The enhanced protection of public officials from defamation has a long history in Brazil, while
in the United States public criticism of government officials or candidates for office that are potentially
defamatory in nature has, since the 1960s, often been seen as an important component of an open
political process. Therefore, to those most accustomed to the United States policy of enhanced
protection for those defaming public officials, the Brazilian system that considers it worse to insult a
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public official than an ordinary person seems anti-democratic or overly protective of those in power.
On the other hand, some argue that those willing to perform public service at their own personal risk
should receive protection from personal attacks. However, if the anti-racist speech provision of the
anti-defamation law in Brazil were to be invoked in such a case, a public official who is the object of
racist remarks should perhaps be permitted even further enhanced protection. This matter has not
been discussed in the Brazilian literature, nor has it yet been considered in the United States.
Despite, or perhaps because of its absurdity, the Góes case was used in campaigns by
international organizations, such as Reporters Without Borders, Article 19, Committee to Protect
Journalists, and International Freedom of Expression Exchange (the Canadian-based free expression
network currently known as IFEX), to illustrate a lack of press freedom in Brazil. Their stories about
the case invariably glossed its details as “exposing corruption”—an overstatement that concealed more
than it revealed. As is the case in Brazil (and elsewhere, other than the United States), the word
“corruption” is often used to increase political stakes at the local or national level and to attract
international attention. Allegations of corruption are mostly reserved for developing countries and
most recently particularly for the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) that
pose economic challenges on the world scene. This is not to deny the existence of corruption and
illegal financial practices in those countries, but to point out that the media, governments, and
international nongovernmental organizations often deploy the discourse of corruption strategically.
The Góes case, rather than being about corruption, was more accurately about personal
animosity and political differences that erupted into a public argument in which a traditional notion
of “honor” was invoked. As explained in the courts’ decisions, evidence of the judge’s loss of dignity
was crucial to the outcome of the case because loss of honor and dignity are fundamental elements of
the statutory crime of injúria for which the blogger Goés was prosecuted. Although difficult to
understand for those of us in the United States who take for granted an expansive interpretation of
free speech as embodied in the First Amendment, this odd case can serve as a point of entry to
investigate its placement within the firmament of Brazilian legal tradition and constitutional law.
Moreover, the case can provide an unusual opening for a consideration of how honor, dignity, and
free speech may be related.
Honor, Dignity, and Racist Speech
Honor has received more attention than dignity in historical work on Brazilian life and law.12
Protection of honor was most often invoked to preserve the position and status of a person in power,
supporting and reinforcing a fundamentally unequal social system. Based on a colonial system
concerned above all else with honor and status, the advent of the Brazilian Republic in 1889 and the
first postcolonial Penal Code, enacted a year later, reveal “more continuity than change from colonial
to modern times” (Uribe-Uran 458). The Penal Code of 1890, although “a far cry from the colonial
Philippine Code”, was “permeated by rigidly hierarchical, status-based conceptions of public honor
and draconian punishments for its infringement. Yet it still enshrined a broadly defined concept of
honor as a fundamental individual right and attribute” (Fischer 181). In fact, the current law governing
injúria under which Góes was prosecuted is not very different from the law as it stood in 1890, although
the prescribed punishments are very much reduced. Always considered a “private crime,” prosecution
can only be initiated by the injured party, as it was by Judge Edson Ulisses.
Dignity, while sometimes included as a discursive sibling of honor, has a related yet distinct
trajectory. Honor was seen as protecting an individual’s reputation or face to the world, while dignity
carried a more internal sense, protecting an individual’s self-worth (Fischer 182).13 As noted above,
this aspect of the Góes case alleging injúria was an important deciding factor in ruling in favor of Judge
Edson Ulisses. The court reproduced the judge’s testimony in full supporting the damage he had
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suffered in which he detailed how the words of the blog post attacked the “core of his personhood,”
especially since he had always been an important defender of human rights. While subjective and
difficult to measure, the importance of dignity and what it has come to mean in recent years holds the
key to assessing the variety of perspectives on free speech in liberal democracies.
With the development of a democratic aspiration and ethos in Brazil, earlier aristocratic
notions of honor have increasingly become associated with a broader distribution of dignity
throughout society. What legal history described as a protection of the hierarchical status quo in the
form of crimes against honor became, in the late twentieth century, associated with the protection of
individual dignity as a right for all citizens —an equalizing measure designed to enhance the rights of
those who had never before been entitled to traditional notions of honor. And with a legal
commitment to equality comes the drive to protect that equality. Shortly after the end of the Brazilian
military regime (1964-1985), a Constituent Assembly was formed in 1987 with more than 550 elected
delegates who worked for over a year in committees, holding hearings, and receiving letters, petitions,
and testimony from across society. The result of those deliberations was the democratic Constitution
of 1988, which begins with an affirmation of the foundational importance of dignity. Brazil, it
proclaims, is a “democratic state founded on the dignity of the human person” (Article 1, III).
This emphasis on dignity has been interpreted by legal scholars as infusing the traditional
notion of honor with a duty of equal treatment and respect for all individuals in their personal and
professional lives, with special attention to self-esteem and individual autonomy. Often associated
with a Kantian perspective on dignity, this provision was modeled on the German constitution of
1949 (Martins; Sarlet).14 It is the first hint that the Brazilian constitutional limitation on freedom of
expression is tied to the post-World War II European impetus to protect individual members of
vilified minorities against the effects of institutionalized hatred (with postwar Germany as the clearest
example). Evidence of this transition from honor to dignity is best illustrated in the watershed Brazilian
case of Siegfried Ellwanger, who in 2003 was condemned by a state court for the crime of racism for
publishing books that spread prejudice against Jews. This was the first hate speech case to come
before the Brazilian Supreme Court, which upheld Ellwanger’s conviction by a seven to three vote.
The majority opinions considered this case as an opportunity to address the perceived conflict between
free speech, on the one hand, and equality and anti-discrimination, on the other.
This is unlike the United States, whose unqualified constitutional protection of free speech is
unusual on the world scene. The first amendment to the United States Constitution states, “Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances” (emphasis added). On its face, no balancing is
required—freedom of speech is supreme and unfettered. Brazil’s free speech provision, on the other
hand, is not facially unlimited, and thus requires direct balancing of two fundamental rights—personal
dignity and freedom of expression (Ardenghi; Farias). The Ellwanger case provided the opportunity
for the Brazilian Supreme Court to address this balance directly.
Because “constitutional text matters” (Krotoszynksi 215), the language of the Brazilian
Constitution itself is an important place to start. Article 5, with its 78 sections, sets forth the terms
under which all residents of Brazil are guaranteed “the right to life, liberty, equality, security, and
property”. Those terms include: the “free expression of thought, so long as not expressed
anonymously” (Section 4); “free expression of intellectual, artistic, scientific activity, and of
communication” (Section 9); the “inviolability of intimacy, private life, honor, and image” (Section
10); and Article 220, which expands on freedom of the press, reaffirming the limitation that Section
10 (privacy) places on that freedom. Brazilian constitutional limitations on free speech, grounded in
human dignity, reflect international law as well as the laws of almost all Western democracies, except
for the United States. Article 19, the international nongovernmental organization that paid for Góes
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to testify at the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, mentioned in the opening of this
article, is named for the free speech provision of the 1976 International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (of which Brazil is a signatory). Ironically, however, unlike the First Amendment to the United
States Constitution, and more like the Brazilian 1988 Constitution, Article 19 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is explicitly limited by “respect for the reputation of others”.
Long before the Brazilian Constitution was adopted in 1988 in an atmosphere of incipient
democratic debate, an anti-press freedom law, known as the Press Law of 1967 (Law No. 5250/67),
was decreed in preparation for the darkest days of the military regime, which began with the
declaration of Institutional Act 5 (AI-5) in December 1968. That draconian anti-press law, with broad
terms and long, mandatory prison sentences added to those of the standard anti-defamation provisions
of the Penal Code, placed specific restraints on journalists “by banning information that [was] contrary
to good customs, decency, family values, and even national symbols” (Lanao 351). Although used
much less often after the 1988 Constitution came into effect, the Press Law of 1967 remained on the
books for twenty years—well into the consolidation of democracy in Brazil.15 It was finally declared
unconstitutional by the Brazilian Supreme Court in 2009 with a 7 to 4 vote.16 The powerful language
of the majority opinion did not find it necessary to address, let alone overturn, the sections of the
Brazilian Penal Code that continues to levy criminal sanctions on various forms of defamation,
including injúria (under which Góes was prosecuted) and injúria qualificada (against hate speech—more
about this below), which had been added in 1997.17 Interestingly, the majority opinion of the Supreme
Court overturning the Press Law of 1967 was reprinted in its entirety in the decision condemning the
journalist Góes. The court pointed out that Góes was not being prosecuted under the Press Law of
1967, but rather under the criminal libel law (injúria in this case) that remains in effect.
It is my contention that the criminal libel law under which Góes was prosecuted (and had been
in place in some form for over a century) was left in place and has not been declared unconstitutional
precisely because it has come to be seen as protecting human dignity. The key to this argument is that
a provision for injúria qualificada was added in 1997, which provides an enhanced legal remedy for
individuals who are subjected to racist hate speech. Returning to the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, the provision immediately following the eponymous Article 19 prohibits
“advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility
or violence”. This language of Article 20 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
is equivalent to Article 5, Section 42 of Brazil’s 1988 Constitution, which makes racism, including
racist speech, an unbailable offense. Some assert that the addition of injúria qualificada created an endrun around the constitutional anti-racism provision by allowing bail for racism, with the result that
individuals who hurl racial insults do not go to jail, seen as a serious problem. At the same time, there
is a clear increase in complaints. According to Raíssa Lopes, in the state of Minas Gerais (where there
is no police office dedicated to taking racist criminal complaints, as there are in São Paulo and Rio de
Janeiro), in 2013 there were 167 complaints of crimes resulting from racism, while in just the first four
months of 2014 there were already 66 complaints. In Brasília, the number of complaints rose 40%
from 2012 to 2013 (310 to 434). All of these provisions, together with increased public awareness of
them, are evidence of the international consensus that hate speech should be prohibited. They go hand
in hand with the limitations that a commitment to human dignity, in the form of protection of the
intimate self, place on unfettered freedom of expression in the overwhelming majority of democratic
countries in the world today—again, except for the United States.18
Balancing Freedom and Equality
In countries such as Brazil and in many parts of Europe where a “culture of honor” was
historically predominant, the expectation of respect that goes hand in hand with notions of honor has,
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since the late twentieth century, begun to be democratized (Whitman 1328). These systems can be
seen as “hav[ing] human ‘dignity’ today largely because they had personal ‘honor’ in the past”
(Whitman 1385). Moreover, dignity has become integral to the post-World War II human rights
regime (Beitz), which since the late 1970s has become, for many, critical to humanitarian hope for the
future (Moyn). Dignity has also become the justification for limiting free speech (Carmi) and
“expresses the idea of the high and equal rank of every human person” (Waldron and Dan-Cohen 14).
In other words, Brazil can be seen as using the modern concept of dignity, as it has been incorporated
into human rights discourse, to tip the balance of free speech versus equality in favor of the latter. By
infusing the language of “honor” with the discourse of “dignity”, countries such as Brazil (in line with
the postwar European trend) are taking a stand on group libel, a term often preferred by countries
that outlaw it (Waldron 40) and a term that comports with the language of Article 20 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“any advocacy of national, racial or religious
hatred”). As such, they are choosing to prevent attacks on the dignity of members of society, to avoid
a “polluted social environment”, and to “protect an atmosphere of mutual respect” (Waldron 35, 30)
at the expense of absolute free speech.
This can be seen most clearly in relation to the criminalization of racism. Brazil’s governments,
since the postwar democratic period, have consistently criminalized racism, and particularly racist
speech. The 1988 Constitution makes racism an unbailable offense and a number of laws since then,
including the injúria qualificada addition to the Penal Code in 1997 have been enacted to operationalize
that constitutional provision by increasing penalties for defamation if it involves racist speech.19 With
the exception of a handful of law journal articles, there has been very little public discussion in Brazil
of what in the United States is seen as an almost intractable contradiction between regulating hate
speech and the First Amendment, which since the mid-twentieth century has been the symbol of an
unfettered right to free speech.
The United States perspective is often referred to as speech absolutism, authoritarianism, or
fundamentalism (Gilreath; Waldron). In the view of legal scholar and gay rights activist Shannon
Gilreath, the expanding breadth of the First Amendment to include anything short of “fighting words”
in relation to personal invective (and not restricted to political speech) leaves little room for
considering the effects of words on equality rights (122). In his view “it is entirely consistent with the
commitment to free speech to draw a distinction between speech that has as its aim genuine political
debate […] and speech that has as its aim the silence and demoralization of others” (Gilreath 213).
Gilreath places hope in a case in which the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals approved a high school’s
decision to forbid a student’s homophobic t-shirt on the grounds that it condemned and denigrated
other students on the basis of their sexual orientation (117). In an unusual move for United States
federal jurisprudence, rather than looking at possible disruption as a justification (the test of “clear
and present danger”), the court examined the right to be free from “assaultive speech” short of
fighting words. 20 From the perspective of Gilreath and others who would like to see greater
consideration given to the power of language as a force equivalent to other forms of illegal
discrimination, this case may be the beginning of a shift in perspective—a shift that could lead the
United States in the direction of Brazil and Western Europe in relation to hate speech regulation.21
Scholars and members of the general public in the United States are rethinking the
“marketplace of ideas” argument for absolute free speech. In the words of media historian John
Durham Peters, expressing his critique of that doctrine, the “credo that anything is permitted because
everything in the end advances the public good looks dubious, and the theodicy that pain always bears
fruit seems indecent” (287). In 1990, legal scholar Charles Lawrence published a bracing argument in
the Duke Law Journal in favor of campus speech codes, which although declared unconstitutional in
the 1990s recently captured the imagination of my large class of undergraduates, many of whom suffer
racist slights on a regular basis. The recent revelations about sexual assault on college campuses, and
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the accompanying increased enforcement of Title IX by the Justice Department, raises the possibility
of a return to some form of in loco parentis on campuses. That doctrine was in effect until the early
1970s when, as a result of campus unrest and demands, the Family Educational Right to Privacy Act
of 1974 (FERPA) was enacted. That law, still in force, provides college students who are over the age
of eighteen with rights of privacy that keep their educational records confidential and out of the reach
of their parents and other family members. Now that there is a call for greater attention to the safety
of college students, the question whether there might be a return to greater university-level
administrative protection of students is being discussed. If so, it would be interesting to consider how
speech codes (forbidding racist and other forms of hate speech on campus), which were overturned
by federal courts twenty-five years ago, might fare in the current climate of greater demands for
oversight of the emotional and psychological well-being of college students.
Since those campus speech codes were overturned, there has emerged a cadre of US scholars
who are dedicated to considering the pain that language can inflict and to finding legal means of
addressing that pain.22 As a result, regulating hate speech is beginning to look a bit less blasphemous
in the theoretical universe of First Amendment scholarship than it was for most of the twentieth
century.23 Even some of those who believe that freedom in the United States depends on protecting
“the thought that we hate”, such as Anthony Lewis (157-167), have been moving toward rethinking
protection of historically demeaned minorities from hateful public speech. Debate in the United
States, which seemed to be settled not that long ago, has found renewed life with the Internet, bullying,
and, most recently, nongovernmental consequences exacted for racist speech. In that regard, it is
important to note that approximately fifteen states in the United States have criminal libel laws on the
books and many are still in use, mostly in connection with cyber-bullying cases (Pritchard).24
Conclusion
This article has traced an unusual conceptual road from a seemingly odd case of criminal
defamation involving a blogger and a judge in the smallest state of Brazil to the grand question of hate
speech regulation in Western democracies. By considering the infusion of traditional notions of honor
and status with post-World War II views of dignity, it is possible to see that a case whose result can
be the subject of international press freedom campaigns can also be used to drive a comparative
consideration of how best to combat racism and whether hate speech regulation should be part of
that struggle. As such, the type of law often used to protect the powerful in Brazil could come to be
used to protect the vulnerable in the United States. When, as Brazilian constitutional scholar Daniel
Sarmento (238) notes, “hate speech is destined exclusively to negate the fundamental principal of
equality between people, propagating inferiority of some and legitimating discrimination”, the irony
of free speech becomes more than just a scholarly debate.
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Notes
Violence against journalists in Brazil today and since democratization in the mid 1980s is not state repression
or state sponsored. Rather, private parties, often through hired gunmen, sometimes perpetrate such violence
to keep corporate or individual wrongdoing from the public eye or to aid in a political campaign. For coverage
emanating from the United States of violence against Brazilian journalists, see Journalism in the Americas, a blog
sponsored
by
the
Knight
Center
of
the
University
of
Texas
at
Austin
(https://knightcenter.utexas.edu/blog/00-14077-freedom-expression-unfulfilled-promise-brazil); Council on
Hemispheric Affairs (http://www.coha.org/press-freedom-in-brazil-sound-the-alarm/); and Freedom House
(http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2013/brazil#.U9P3MFbBCRI).
2 Although it is not addressed in this article, one could argue that publicity regarding violations of press freedom
is, in part, politically motivated, i.e. by political forces opposed to the current government. The political
positioning of the Brazilian media has been noted by some Brazilian social scientists after the coverage of the
pre-World Cup protests in 2013. See Feres, Miguel, and Barbabela for an empirical analysis of news reports on
the protests in mainstream Brazilian media sources.
3 The international nongovernmental organization Article 19 (http://www.article19.org), founded in 1987,
opened its doors in Brazil in 2008. Its concern with freedom of expression is focused on the world outside of
the United States (http://www.article19.org/pages/en/where-we-work.html) and is named for Article 19 of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted in 1966 and entered into force in 1976, which
provides that: (1) Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference; (2) Everyone shall have
the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and
ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any
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other media of his choice; (3) The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with
it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be
such as are provided by law and are necessary: (a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others; (b) For the
protection of national security or of public order, or of public health or morals.
4 For a video recording of the October, 29, 2013 hearing at the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights,
see https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CtTlkaIeZKI.
5 Appointments of judges are conducted through the state bar association, which puts forward three names.
The governor then chooses from that list.
6 In 2011, an investigation of Governor Marcelo Déda was initiated by the federal attorney’s office (for which
Góes worked at the time) on similar grounds, but did not result in prosecution.
7 The full text of the blog post, “Eu, o coronel em mim”, dated May 29, 2012, can be found at the following
site: http://www.infonet.com.br/josecristiangoes/ler.asp?id=128810. All quotations from the blog post and
the judicial opinions in the text are my translations.
8 For a famous treatment in film of coronelismo, see the 1978 film directed by Geraldo Sarno, Coronel Delmiro
Gouviea. For a historical and socio-political analysis of the subject, see Faoro.
9 See Brazilian Penal Code, Articles 138, 139, 140, and 141. This is a different model than that developed by
the United States Supreme Court. In the case at hand, the judge was both a public official and elderly, thus
increasing the penalty. In 1964, the United States Supreme Court held in New York Times vs. Sullivan that a public
figure, including a public official, carries a greater burden of proof to obtain damages in a civil defamation
action.
10 Edson Ulisses de Melo v. José Cristian Góes, Penal Pública Condionada, Juizado Especial Criminal da
Comarca de Aracaju, Sergipe, Sentença, July 4, 2013 (Processo No. 201245102580); Recurso de Apelação,
Acordão No. 5450/2013, October 22, 2013 (Processo No. 201301008618). A three-judge panel heard the
appeal. The vote was two to one with the dissenter arguing that the criminal defamation law should not be
enforced as a violation of freedom of the press. On August 15, 2014, the Brazilian Supreme Court denied
Góes’s further appeal and let the appellate court’s decision stand and remain in effect.
11 See Pasqualucci for a comparison of positions on free speech (limitations versus absolute right) by the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights, the European Court of Human Rights, and the United Nations
Human Rights Committee.
12 For examples of historical treatment of honor in Brazilian life, see Beattie; Caulfield; Fischer; Rebhun; Santos.
13 The much discussed difference between honor and honra in early modern peninsular Spain is most often
associated with Américo Castro’s explanation that “El idioma distinguía entre la noción ideal e objetiva del
‘honor’, y el funcionamiento de esa misma noción, vitalmente realizada en un proceso de vida. El honor es, pero
la honra pertenece a alguien, actúa y se está moviendo en una vida” (69). For Castro, “la palabra honra parece
más adherida al alma de quien siente derruido o mermado lo que antes existía con plenitud e seguridad” (70).
Donald Larson (7), cited in Barahona (233), summarizes that difference as “in sixteenth and seventeenthcentury Spain honor was derived both from who one was as from what one was”. In this conceptualization of a
distinction made by literary scholars, perhaps one can see the germ of a connection between modern notions
of the difference between honor and dignity.
14 Article 1(1) of the German Constitution provides, “Human dignity shall be inviolable. To respect and protect
it shall be the duty of all state authority”.
15 For the roles, both potential and real, that literary and musical production played in contributing to the
dismantling of the hegemony of the Press Law of 1967, see Atencio; Lehnen; and the music of Chico Buarque
and Geraldo Vandré, among others.
16 Supreme Court Justice Carlos Ayres Britto, who wrote the primary decision declaring the Press Law of 1967
unconstitutional, was the uncle of the named partner in the law firm that represented Góes in the Aracaju court
and lost the appeal. Britto has been consistent in his position on absolute freedom of expression, including his
dissenting opinion in the Ellwanger case.
17 The international organization Committee to Protect Journalists, on May 7, 2009, published an article
declaring victory when the Press Law of 1967 was overturned. It is interesting to note that, although the
Committee to Protect Journalists called for the overturning of the existing criminal libel law, it made no mention
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of the anti-racist speech provision added in 1997. See http://www.cpj.org/2009/05/in-victory-for-pressbrazils-high-court-strikes-do.php.
18 See the Joint Declaration on Universality and the Right to Freedom of Expression issued on May 6, 2014 by
the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression, the Organization for Security
and Co-operation in Europe Representative on Freedom of the Media, the Organization of American States
Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights
Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and Access to Information, available at
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/expression/showarticle.asp?artID=945&lID=1.
19 See Silveira 64-71.
20 The case in question is Harper v. Poway Unified School District, Ninth Circuit 2006. According to Gilreath, this
is the first time that the first prong of the Tinker test on students’ rights in public schools had been invoked.
21 On the other side, as an example of the Supreme Court’s expanding view of free speech absolutism, is the
case RAV vs. City of St. Paul (1992), in which the majority ruled that cross burning in front of the house of a
black family is protected speech and not the equivalent of fighting words. For a critique of this case, see Butler.
22 See Fiss; Hernandez; Rosenfeld; Schauer; Waldron.
23 In all the recent literature questioning the almost sacred assertion of absolute freedom of speech, there has
been discussion of a Supreme Court decision, Beauharnais v. Illinois (1952), in which group libel was made an
exception to the absolute right to free speech. Although Beauharnais has never been explicitly overturned,
most courts conclude that it was eviscerated by later Supreme Court cases, particularly New York Times v. Sullivan
(1964), and that it has no lasting effect. However, given its citation in so much of the recent literature rethinking
hate speech, a resurrection may be in the offing.
24 See Lisby and http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/criminal-libel-statutes-state-by-state. For example, in
the state of North Carolina, which still has a criminal statute for libel applicable to the press, a senate bill
prohibiting Internet libel was introduced in 2009, although did not become law at that time. See
http://mountainx.com/news/communitynews/bloggers_gone_bad_criminal_penalty_for_libel_considered/.

